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Elements, Compounds, and Other
Chemical Kinds
Robin Findlay Hendry†‡
In this article I assess the problems and prospects of a microstructural approach to
chemical substances. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam famously claimed that to be gold
is to have atomic number 79 and to be water is to be H2O. I relate the first claim to
the concept of element in the history of chemistry, arguing that the reference of element
names is determined by atomic number. Compounds are more difficult: water is so
complex and heterogeneous at the molecular level that ‘water is H2O’ seems false under
some interpretations. I sketch a response to this problem.
1. Introduction. Chemical substances are the central kinds of chemistry,
as important to understanding that science as the species concept—if there
is just one—is to understanding the biological sciences. They are elements,
compounds, or mixtures: elements are just those that have no other chem-
ical substances as components. Here are three claims about elements: in
the eighteenth century, long before any direct investigation of atomic
structure, chemists used element names with determinate extensions; mem-
bership of those extensions was conferred by having atoms with particular
nuclear charges; and the chemical facts that make all this so were unknown
until the twentieth century, so if they are known now they must have been
discovered.
The determinate extensions of ‘hydrogen’, ‘oxygen’, and other element
names were picked out via the intentions with which the element names
were used, for substances that could survive chemical change, be com-
ponents of other substances, and whose presence could explain a com-
†To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Durham University,
50 Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HN, UK; e-mail: r.f.hendry@durham.ac.uk.
‡I would like to thank Joseph LaPorte and Paul Needham for their comments on
previous versions of this article, and Valentin Ostrovsky for the nuclear reaction ex-
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pound’s behavior. The only special thing about ‘hydrogen’ and ‘oxygen’
was that they were chemical neologisms, introduced by Antoine Lavoisier
in the 1780s. This is relevant because other elements like gold, iron, lead,
and sulfur had been known and named since ancient times. If an element’s
name was used without the ‘elemental intentions’, then either its extension
was to some extent indeterminate, as Joseph LaPorte argues (2004), or it
was determined in some other way. I do not know when these intentions
first appear, but they seem necessary though not sufficient for the emer-
gence of modern chemistry.
The three claims about elements add up to a strong case for micro-
structuralism. Microstructuralism about a natural kind is the thesis that
membership of that kind is conferred by microstructural properties.
Kripke and Putnam advanced microstructuralist claims about biological
species (tigers and lemons) and chemical substances (gold and water), but
biological microstructuralism seems implausible given the wide micro-
structural variation within biological species. Perhaps membership of bi-
ological kinds is conferred instead by historical or causal relations to
particular populations of organisms. Or perhaps, as John Dupre´ argues
(1993), different kind-membership conditions are appropriate to different
classificatory interests and modes of biological explanation. Now these
arguments—against microstructuralism and for pluralism—are local to
biology. Chemistry, I argue, is different: the interests that govern its clas-
sifications are more unified, and in most cases membership of its kinds
is conferred by microstructural properties.
In Section 2, I give a semantic and historical argument for micro-
structuralism about the elements: since the late eighteenth century, ele-
ments have been named within a framework of modal assumptions that,
given the laws governing chemical behavior, pick out nuclear charge as
determining the application of the name. Compounds are more difficult:
I have no general argument for microstructuralism about them, so instead
I will respond to some important criticisms of it by Paul Needham (2000,
2002) and Jaap van Brakel (2000). Perhaps arguments for, or against,
microstructuralism about compounds ought to be made case by case. In
Section 3, I will discuss one famous philosophical example: water.
2. Elements. In 1787, Lavoisier and others proposed a reformed nomen-
clature for chemistry, in which the names of compound substances would
reflect their elemental composition. Phlogistonists complained that the
new nomenclature was theoretically laden, embodying substantial com-
positional claims, illegitimately embedding the reality of oxygen in the
very language of chemistry, and excluding phlogiston, its explanatory role
usurped jointly by oxygen and caloric, the matter of heat (see Beretta
1993, Chapter 4). The binomial nomenclature survives in modern chem-
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istry, along with key elements from the list of simple substances in La-
voisier’s Traite´ Ele´mentaire de Chimie (1789, 175–176). What conception
of element underlay these innovations? Interestingly, there are two quite
distinct conceptions: one explicit and one implicit.
In the preface to the Traite´, Lavoisier proposed an analytical definition
of ‘simple substance’ to supplant a priori metaphysical speculation about
the ultimate principles of which things are made: he undertook to treat
substances as simple until ‘experiment and observation’ prove otherwise
(1789, xxiv). While it is widely associated with Lavoisier’s name, this
definition of element was not original to him. Nor is it what motivated
his uses of the names of particular elements like oxygen in chemical ex-
planation. Furthermore, he applied the analytical criterion only patchily.
He excluded many substances that had not been decomposed in the lab-
oratory from his list of simple substances: some (like soda and potash)
because by chemical analogy he suspected them of being compounds;
others because he thought they contained as components one or more of
his hypothetical elements (caloric, the ether, the fluoric radical) and, hence,
must be compounds (see Hendry 2005, Section 2).
The new compositional nomenclature embodied another, implicit no-
tion of element, which is also at work in Lavoisier’s thinking about chem-
ical substances: only this second notion can explain the role of oxygen in
Lavoisier’s theory of acidity. Lavoisier had noted in the 1770s that air is
absorbed in the formation of nitric, sulfuric, and phosphoric acids. By
the time of the Traite´ he had concluded that acids are a chemical genus
whose characteristic component is oxygen, and whose differentiae are
various acidifiable ‘principles’ like azote (nitrogen), sulfur, and phospho-
rus. When oxygenated to a higher degree, the principles form stronger
acids: compare sulfurous and sulfuric acids, phosphorous and phosphoric
acids, and nitrous and nitric acids. In the Traite´ Lavoisier provided a
summary table of oxygen’s compounds with various other elements (1789,
facing page 185). If oxygen can be the common component of a range of
different substances, it must be capable of surviving chemical change. If it
can bestow acidity on its compounds, it must at least partly determine their
behavior. Hence Lavoisier’s implicit notion of element, embodied in his use
of the names of particular elements in chemical explanation, is the notion
of a substance that (i) is a component of other substances, (ii) can survive
chemical change, and (iii) whose presence can explain the chemical and
physical behavior of its compounds. Oxygen was not unique in being the
subject of these assumptions: Lavoisier thought caloric to be the charac-
teristic chemical component of ‘ae¨riform fluids’, or gases (1789, 15).
Moving on to the nineteenth century, D. I. Mendeleev made Lavoisier’s
implicit notion of element quite explicit, distinguishing between the two
different notions that we have already seen in use by Lavoisier: on the
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one hand, there is chlorine the poisonous green gas that F. A. Paneth
(1962) called a ‘simple substance’; on the other hand is chlorine the com-
ponent of common salt and hydrogen chloride (Paneth’s ‘basic sub-
stance’). Chlorine the green gas is not present in salt but is used up in its
formation. Mendeleev also noted that basic substances, rather than simple
substances, occupy the places in the periodic table, because those places
are allotted on the basis of properties of the compounds as well as of the
free elements (i.e., simple substances). Mendeleev noted the explanatory
requirements on basic substances and reasoned that they must carry from
their simple substances to their compounds some property that determines
their behavior in the different contexts. He identified the property in
question as atomic, or elemental, weight (see Hendry 2005, Section 3).
In 1923, the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry
(IUPAC) proposed to redefine ‘element’ in the light of isotopy: the existence
of atoms with the same atomic number, but different atomic weights (see
Kragh 2000, Section 3). Paneth had earlier (in 1916) argued for nuclear
charge as the defining property of the elements, pointing out that even
though isotopes are not identical in their behavior—there are thermody-
namic differences consequent on their different masses—they are chemically
interchangeable, in the sense that they undergo the same chemical reactions.
The redefinition was the subject of prolonged debate: before the funda-
mental relationship between nuclear charge, electronic structure, and chem-
ical behavior was understood, nuclear charge seemed to some chemists more
of a physicists’ property, of little relevance to chemistry. Furthermore, the
redefinition broke with the idea, handed down from Dalton, that elements
are composed of identical atoms. Nor did the discussion end with the
IUPAC decision. In the 1930s, when the different isotopes of hydrogen
were discovered, Ida Noddack argued that, since they can be separated
by electrolysis, protium (1H) and deuterium (2D) are not chemically iden-
tical. Now, once it is realized that atoms that were once counted as being
of the same element (like 35Cl and 37Cl) have different masses, it is obvious
that the ‘atomic weights’ measured by nineteenth-century chemists like
Mendeleev pertain not to single species of atoms but to populations of
atoms: chlorine’s atomic weight of about 35.5 is a weighted average dom-
inated by 35Cl (76%) and 37Cl (24%). Given that it makes no sense to
classify atoms according to the statistical properties of heterogeneous
ensembles to which they happen to belong, to argue for the retention of
atomic weight as the basis of the periodic table is a radical stance, not a
conservative one, requiring wholesale reform of the periodic system.
Hence Noddack proposed a system of some 260 isotope-elements (Kragh
2000, 442–443). Ironically, it seems that Mendeleev’s periodic table, with
its clear presentation of chemical trends and analogies, could be preserved
in 1923 only by changing the property that defined each place in it.
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Joseph LaPorte (2004, 103–110) puts isotopy to good use in a thought
experiment that turns the philosophical lesson of Putnam’s ‘Twin Earth’
on its head. LaPorte considers a group of scientists, trained before the
discovery of isotopy, who travel to a planet where heavy water (2D2O) fills
the rivers and lakes. Observing (among other differences) that Earth fish
soon die when placed in the Twin Earth ‘water’, the scientists conclude
that it is a different substance from water. Isotopy is discovered back on
Earth while they are away, but the scientists who stayed at home decide
that deuterium is hydrogen and that heavy water is water. Do the traveling
scientists make a mistake? LaPorte argues not: regarding heavy water as
falling within the extension of ‘water’ was a decision that was taken when
isotopy was discovered. Prior usage was indeterminate.
Now the differences in behavior between isotopes are subtle and quan-
titative—thermodynamic and kinetic—rather than gross and qualitative.
These differences can be magnified in striking ways and underlie the pro-
cesses of their separation. For instance, heavy water is mildly toxic be-
cause, compared with protium oxide, it slows down various metabolic
processes by a factor of 6 or 7. This is enough to kill fish, which cling to
life within a narrow band of kinetic viability. The kinetic differences shown
by hydrogen’s isotopes are far more marked than those for other elements,
however, because isotope variations are marginal effects, determined by
percentage differences between their atomic weights: adding a neutron to
a heavier nucleus makes a smaller proportional difference. In fact, isotope
effects diminish rapidly as atomic weight increases. Thus, for instance,
reactions involving 37Cl are slowed down only by a modest factor of 1.01
or so with respect to 35Cl. So the isotope effect in hydrogen is an extreme
case: a monster, not a paradigm. In other cases, atomic charge is the
overwhelming determinant of chemical behavior, and atomic weight is a
negligible factor. Now this establishes only that, given the global facts
about isotopic variation, IUPAC’s decision to count deuterium as hy-
drogen was by far the most natural one. A response to LaPorte’s argu-
ment, however, must show more: that prior usage of ‘hydrogen’ picked
out a determinate extension, that membership of the extension was earned
by having a particular nuclear charge, and that atomic weight was irrel-
evant. The scientific realist’s view of the matter, that these things were
discovered rather than stipulated, is tenable only if this prior determinacy
can be established. That argument I will now supply.
Consider again Lavoisier. He had the ability to prepare samples of
hydrogen in the laboratory. His preparation methods gathered popula-
tions of atoms with a nuclear charge of 1, regardless of their atomic
weights. As a matter of fact his atomic populations would have consisted
overwhelmingly of 1H, but that reflected his starting materials, not his
methods of preparation. Lavoisier intended element names to refer in-
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differently to their different states of chemical combination and assumed
that the presence of an element in a compound explained the chemical
properties of the compound. His theories of acidity and the gaseous state
both make these assumptions, about oxygen and caloric respectively. Fi-
nally, of the candidate properties that survive chemical change, it is nuclear
charge, and not atomic weight, that overwhelmingly determines the chem-
ical behavior of both elements and compounds, via the electronic structure
of free and bound atoms. Hence Lavoisier’s intentions uniquely pick out
sameness of nuclear charge as the important similarity relation for ele-
ments, given the laws that govern the causal processes he was interested
in explaining. LaPorte’s semantic indeterminacy does not arise for the
names of the elements because they were given in a semantic context that
was structured by implicit modal assumptions about the elements. Of
course, ‘heavy water’ names a compound rather than an element, but the
same factors that make isotopic differences irrelevant to element identity
apply also to compounds. As long as the same interests govern the ex-
tension of compound names, if deuterium is hydrogen then heavy water
is water.
3. Compounds. If elemental composition were sufficient to determine
chemical-kind membership for compounds, extending my argument for
microstructuralism to compounds would be simple, though nontrivial.
However, isomerism makes elemental composition insufficient. Isomers are
distinct compounds with distinct chemical and physical properties that con-
tain the same elements in the same proportions. For instance, ethanol
(CH3CH2OH), the active ingredient of whisky, boils at 78.4C. Methoxy-
methane (dimethyl ether, CH3OCH3) is sometimes used as an aerosol pro-
pellant and boils at 24.9C. Clearly the distinctness of ethanol and
methoxymethane as substances must lie in their different molecular struc-
tures, but the appeal to structure is vague and problematic in a number
of ways, as Needham (2000, 2002) and van Brakel (2000) have pointed
out. First, sameness of molecular structure is a vague relation, and this
vagueness will be inherited by criteria of sameness of substance that de-
pend on it. Second, some compound substances are heterogeneous at the
molecular level: even when pure they are complex mixtures of different
microscopic species.
Molecular structure is defined in terms of continuous variables like
internuclear distances and angles between bonds. Therefore the similarity
of one molecular geometry to another is a vague, and so an intransitive
relation. Hence it is not an equivalence relation between molecular struc-
tures, dividing them into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive exten-
sions for chemical kinds. Interatomic geometry will instead group mol-
ecules into vague-bounded, overlapping clusters of similar structures.
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Though vague at their edges, these molecular kinds will typically center
on the low-energy equilibrium geometries that characterize stable chemical
substances. This need not always be so: chemists often give systematic
names to unstable species. For instance, carbonium ions are reactive in-
termediates formed in organic reactions, whose structures and relative
stabilities are important in explaining the mechanisms and products of
additions to alkenes (see, e.g., Roberts and Caserio 1965, 182–184). The
obvious response to this problem of vagueness, then, is to embrace it, for
it presents no antinomy. In any case, given the vast numbers of molecules
involved, vagueness will inevitably infect the relationship between molec-
ular species and macroscopic substances.
Turning now to molecular heterogeneity, the slogan ‘water is H2O’ might
tempt one to think of bodies of water as mere assemblages of H2O mol-
ecules. That identification is challenged by the recognition that real water
is far from homogeneous at the molecular level (Needham 2000). First,
a small but characteristic proportion of the H2O molecules in any body
of pure water—a proportion that varies with temperature—dissociates via
the following equilibrium:
 2H Os H O OH .2 3
Second, undissociated H2O molecules are polar: they display permanent
electric dipoles, amounting to partial charges centred on the hydrogen
and oxygen nuclei. Strong interactions between the permanent electric
dipoles of H2O molecules greatly increase the melting and boiling points
of water in comparison to the hydrides of other elements in its group
(H2S, H2Se, and H2Te). The polarity also gives rise to oligomolecular
species in which H2O molecules are linked by hydrogen bonds between
centers of opposite partial charge. These polymeric species are similar in
structure to ice and affect water’s physical properties, like its viscosity,
right up to its boiling point. In short, macroscopic bodies of water are
complex and dynamic congeries of different molecular species, in which
there is a constant dissociation of individual molecules, reassociation of
ions, and formation, growth, and dissociation of oligomers. Being H2O,
if understood as a molecular condition, cannot capture the molecular
complexity of water.
One might defend the identification of bodies of water with mere as-
semblages of H2O molecules by regarding the ions and oligomers as some-
thing other than water, natural impurities that arise from chemical inter-
actions between H2O molecules. On this view, however, bodies of water
have a short, and necessarily impure, existence. What we thought was a
persisting sample of water we now see as a series of fleeting existences,
causally connected. Leaving aside that unsavory consequence, it is quite
unnatural to view the ions and oligomers as impurities. The transport
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properties of H3O
 and OH ions are responsible for the electrical con-
ductivity of water, so if they are impurities in water then what is normally
called the electrical conductivity of water (and measured as such) is not
a property of water, but of an aqueous solution of its ionic dissociation
products. Conversely, if the electrical conductivity is a property of the
water, the dissociation products must be part of the water. The transport
story is complex: hydrated protons display anomalously high mobility in
water because protons themselves need not move very far through the
liquid. Instead there is a coordinated process of structural diffusion (the
Grotthus mechanism). A proton migrates from one H2O molecule to its
neighbor, which releases a proton to its neighbor, and so on, so that the
excess positive charge of hydronium ions is transported through the water,
but not the ions. This transport mechanism makes it even less plausible
to view the protons as anything but integral parts of the water and of
the mechanism underlying its electrical conductivity. Now turn to the
oligomers: these are similar in structure to ice (one might regard them as
microscopic nascent ice crystals). If the formation of ice is to be a phase
change rather than a change of chemical substance, the oligomers must
be water too. Ice is water in the chemists’ phase-unqualified usage of
‘water’ in which one can ask how much water there is on Mars. Hence
the oligomers are water. I conclude then that samples of water are not
mere assemblages of H2O molecules. But then what are they?
Needham (2000) and van Brakel (2000) see bodies of water as macro-
scopic objects whose microstructure may be investigated empirically. The
microstructure may even explain some properties of water, but according
to Needham and van Brakel, it does not follow from this that water’s
microstructure is what makes it water. I agree that water is a macroscopic
substance and that the molecular complexity issue shows that samples of
water are complex and dynamic entities, heterogeneous at the molecular
level, and relatively independent of the water molecules they contain.
Nevertheless, being water should be understood in terms of composition
by H2O molecules. After all, how else can we make some water except
by creating, or bringing together, some H2O molecules? We must be care-
ful, however, in how we interpret ‘composition’. Composite objects may
bear different relations to their parts. Some composites are mere assem-
blages. Even some bodies of water are mere assemblages: consider, for
instance, a very diffuse cloud of H2O molecules strung out in empty space
between two distant stars. In other cases, the composition involves dy-
namic causal interaction. Consider some H2O molecules brought together
at standard temperature and pressure, interacting spontaneously. They
form liquid water, and as we have seen, some of them dissociate, new
ones form, and so on. Some H2O molecules are ‘used up’ in the process,
like the eggs in a cake. Now distinguish between two kinds of part: com-
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ponents persist in the composite, while ingredients need not persist—they
may be used up in forming the composite. Components and ingredients
participate in the structure of a composite in different ways: components
by persisting, ingredients by offering their parts. Water, then, is the sub-
stance that has H2O molecules as its ingredients, though many of them
will in fact live on in the water. Turning back to the elements for a moment,
it is easy to see the relationship between water and its constituent elements,
hydrogen and oxygen. Considered as simple substances, hydrogen and
oxygen are ingredients. As basic substances they are components, their
persistence underwritten by the continued existence of the nuclei and their
charges.
We may allow that composition be reflexive, so that single H2O mol-
ecules count as water. For Needham and van Brakel, only macroscopic
bodies of stuff can be water, because only macroscopic bodies can bear
the thermodynamic properties—melting point, boiling point, and so on—
that are normally used to identify water. However, even if thermodynamic
properties are used to identify water, it does not follow that they are what
makes it water, and when we ask, for instance, how much of the human
body is water, the answer is independent of the display of any thermo-
dynamic properties in vivo. If so, the possession of macroscopic properties
cannot be necessary. It also seems natural for the extension of ‘water’ to
include individual H2O molecules, because general claims about water
ought to apply to them. If they do count as water, individual H2O mol-
ecules are the smallest items that can qualify as water on their own ac-
count. Hydroxyl ions and protons, in contrast, qualify as water only as
part of a larger body.
My proposal, then, is that water is the substance formed by bringing
together H2O molecules and allowing them to interact spontaneously. One
constraint should be emphasized, however. Consider the following decay
chain, beginning when 16O absorbs two protons:
1 16 18 18 18H O r Ne r F r O.2
This reaction seems to be a theoretical possibility: Coulombic repulsion
between the protons and the oxygen nucleus normally provides a for-
midable energy barrier, but resonances between excited states of 1H2
16O
and 18Ne allow for nonvanishing transition probabilities. Experiments to
see whether the theoretical possibility is realized are inconclusive (see
Belyaev et al. 2001), but the mere possibility is, at first glance, a problem
for my account of water’s identity if it is to have any counternomic ro-
bustness. The exotic isotope 18Ne is formed from an H2O molecule through
a spontaneous internal interaction. Is it water, then, on my account? No:
sameness of elemental composition provides a necessary, though insuffi-
cient, condition for sameness of substance. It is necessary because elements
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survive in their compounds, their survival underwritten by the survival
of the nuclei, as we saw in Section 2. It is insufficient because isomers
exist: different substances with the same elemental composition. The 18Ne
is not water, then, because the basic substances hydrogen and oxygen are
used up in making it. The elemental composition condition on substance
identity requires that elements be components of substances, not mere
ingredients.
I have spent a lot of time on one case: water. This is not only because
Putnam chose it as a widely cited example but also because, as Needham
and van Brakel make clear, its molecular heterogeneity poses important
questions to the microstructuralist. Also, an informed debate can proceed
because extremely detailed information on the structure of water has been
gathered (Franks 1972–1982), perhaps because of the ubiquity and im-
portance of water as a solvent. I have attempted to square the thought
that the H2O molecule is characteristic of water with the fact that samples
of water survive the destruction of individual H2O molecules. My strategy
has been to focus on dynamic composition, that is, how samples of water
are brought into being. My proposal may be too broad: I have placed no
limits on what proportion of the characteristic molecules must survive.
Maybe an ad hoc restriction is required. Alternatively, there may be an-
other way of identifying the characteristic molecule that does not rely on
dynamic composition.
Other compound substances present fewer problems to the micro-
structuralist. Some are simply more uniform as collections of molecules,
while others are typically encountered as components of mixtures, rather
than as (relatively) pure macroscopic samples. In either case there is less
opportunity for the extensions of the substance terms to come apart from
the extensions of the names of their characteristic molecular species.
4. Conclusion. The microstructuralist case for the elements seems strong.
A single microstructural property, nuclear charge, persists through the
various manifestations of an element and is central to explaining the
behavior that historical figures like Lavoisier used to classify substances
and then name them. Compounds, as we have seen, are more problematic
and complex, so that microstructuralism about compounds will need to
be assessed case by case, and water is only one. I have two further com-
ments to make about the scope of the microstructuralist claim.
First, chemistry names kinds at different mereological and logical levels.
Apart from individual compounds and substances, it names kinds of at-
oms, ions, molecules, elements, and compounds, as we have seen, and
also higher kinds like metals and acids. Microstructuralism clearly fails
for one higher kind, the acids. As Ian Hacking (1983, 84–85) and Kyle
Stanford and Philip Kitcher (2000, Section V) point out, no microstruc-
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tural feature unites the acids and the bases; instead there has been a
succession of definitions of acidity that do not corefer, though they do
agree on certain core cases. Hacking is right to argue that the question,
“Is it an acid?” cannot be answered without qualification. We can ask,
‘Is it a Lewis acid?’ or, ‘Is it a Brønsted-Lowry acid?’ and so on, answering
to nothing deeper than relevant definitions. While this discontinuity is an
interesting phenomenon and shows that not all kind terms can be un-
derstood in the same way, it does not reflect on other chemical kinds.
When speaking of elements, chemists do not need to distinguish Lavoisier-
oxygen from Dalton-oxygen, Mendeleev-oxygen, or IUPAC-oxygen. There
is just oxygen, and a history of hypotheses about what characterizes the
substance. These hypotheses do answer to something deeper: oxygen. The
existence of syndrome kinds is no refutation of microstructural accounts
of the elements.
What about ‘water’ and ‘gold’? Remember that ‘oxygen’ was a special
case, an antiphlogistic neologism. In contrast, ‘water’ and ‘gold’ were used
independently of chemistry, which brings us to a second scope issue: dis-
cipline specificity. My argument concerning the elements relies on the
presence of modal intentions that are characteristic of the epistemic in-
terests of chemistry. Many substance terms are used in contexts that are
not governed by these interests. It is well known that the extension of
‘jade’ is not determined by microstructural similarities alone but also by
various manifest properties (e.g., LaPorte 2004, 100). That may be so,
but then the term does not name a chemical substance. This is not a
question-begging move but a substantial claim. The classificatory practices
of a scientific discipline reflect its particular theoretical and explanatory
interests. In chemical company, I bet that every chemist will disambiguate
‘jade’ between jadeite and nephrite.
REFERENCES
Belyaev, V. B., A. K. Motovilov, M. B. Miller, A. V. Sermyagin, I. V. Kuznetzov, Yu. G.
Sobolev, A. A. Smolnikov, A. A. Klimenko, S. B. Osetrov, and S. L. Vasiliev (2001),
“Search for Nuclear Reactions in Water Molecules,” Physics Letters B 522: 222–226.
Beretta, Marco (1993), The Enlightenment of Matter: The Definition of Chemistry from
Agricola to Lavoisier. Canton, MA: Science History.
Dupre´, John (1993), The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of
Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Franks, Felix, ed. (1972–1982), Water: A Comprehensive Treatise. Vols. 1–7. New York:
Plenum.
Hacking, Ian (1983), Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hendry, Robin Findlay (2005), “Lavoisier and Mendeleev on the Elements,” Foundations
of Chemistry 7: 31–48.
Kragh, Helge (2000), “Conceptual Changes in Chemistry: The Notion of a Chemical Ele-
ment, ca. 1900–1925,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics B 31: 435–
450.
CHEMICAL KINDS 875
LaPorte, Joseph (2004), Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Lavoisier, Antoine (1789), Traite´ Ele´mentaire de Chimie. Page references are to Robert Kerr,
trans. (1790), The Elements of Chemistry. Edinburgh: William Creech. Reprint, D. M.
Knight, ed. (1998), The Development of Chemistry. Vol. 2. London: Routledge.
Needham, Paul (2000), “What Is Water?” Analysis 60: 13–21.
——— (2002), “The Discovery That Water is H2O,” International Studies in the Philosophy
of Science 16: 205–226.
Paneth, F. A. (1962), “The Epistemological Status of the Chemical Concept of Element
(II),” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13: 144–160.
Roberts, John, and Marjorie Caserio (1965), Basic Principles of Organic Chemistry. New
York: Benjamin.
Stanford, P. Kyle, and Philip Kitcher (2000), “Refining the Causal Theory of Reference for
Natural Kind Terms,” Philosophical Studies 97: 99–129.
Van Brakel, Jaap (2000), Philosophy of Chemistry. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
